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Latin America Review

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7 June 1985

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**Latin America
Review**

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Articles

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El Salvador: Assessing the Elections

The results of the legislative and municipal elections of 31 March present El Salvador with an unprecedented opportunity to further democratization, address major economic and social problems, and seek an end to the civil war. The degree to which these goals are feasible, however, depends heavily on a major commitment from all sectors toward conciliation and compromise. President Duarte and the ruling Christian Democrats will have to move cautiously with their progressive agenda. In our view, their election did not so much reflect a reformist shift in the country as it did popular recognition of government authority and the opposition's lack of an effective campaign.

Election Results

The scope of the Christian Democratic victory is underscored by its contrast with the 1982 legislative elections. In 1982, the Christian Democrats garnered only 40 percent of the vote and 24 of 60 Assembly seats. This year's balloting provided them with a 53- to 47-percent margin of victory over the conservative opposition, and 33 Assembly seats. They also captured 153 of the country's 262 municipalities and 11 of 14 department capitals.

some Christian Democrats claim that the election reflects a shift of historic political dimensions. They argue that this shift has been latent at least since the 1972 election fraud, in which the slim plurality of then presidential candidate Duarte was reversed by the Central Elections Council in favor of the military candidate, and that subsequent conservative voting

patterns largely stemmed from rightist intimidation. These spokesmen suggest that only after Duarte was elected president last year and the armed forces proved they could serve impartially did the citizenry become convinced that real socioeconomic and political change was being offered.

While we believe the 1985 election was an important part of El Salvador's transition to democracy, it does not appear to represent a sea change in the body politic. For one thing, the 66-percent voter turnout was considerably lower than the 80 percent of the eligible voters who cast ballots in the 1982 and 1984 elections. This was due in part to the success of the guerrillas in interdicting the road system and intimidating travelers from attempting to reach their villages of birth in order to vote. The lower turnout also reflected apathy toward this third electoral contest in 11 months, which inconveniently took place at the outset of the Easter holiday week and was governed by a new electoral law that made voting a "noncompulsory" exercise. Furthermore, a variety of US Embassy sources indicates that moderate rightist National Conciliation Party (PCN) constituents throughout the country abstained from voting because they rejected a coalition arrangement with Roberto D'Aubuisson's extremist Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA). In some areas of the east, for example, abstentionism on the part of PCN supporters was said to be as high as 30 percent, while the Christian Democrats appeared to have suffered only a 5-percent rate of "no shows."

Nevertheless, in a system where low turnouts have previously favored conservative parties, the Christian Democrats did remarkably well, largely because they

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mobilized their rank and file. Moreover, US Embassy [] reporting indicates that the Christian Democrats benefited from their status as the party in power, particularly in the countryside where voters traditionally give the ruling party the benefit of the doubt, regardless of its actual platform. []

Opportunities and Challenges

Notwithstanding the factors that led to the Christian Democratic triumph, the results hold important implications. For the first time in the nation's history, a popularly elected civilian president has a working majority in the Assembly and a military establishment that generally appears committed to the constitutional process. Concurrently, the popular strength of the extreme right and left has been further undermined. A process of internal unraveling could take place in these camps, especially if the Christian Democrats forge a workable relationship with moderate elements in the political and economic sectors. Foreign diplomatic and material support to the government could also increase, particularly if the Duarte administration continues to make progress on human rights issues and develops a coherent national strategy for political and economic stability. To these ends, a variety of US Embassy [] sources indicates Duarte will seek some accommodation with the moderate right and attempt to split the socialist left from the Marxist-Leninist insurgency. []

Disarray in the far right ARENA party, which lost big in the March election, will provide the Christian Democrats with an opportunity to win support from the moderate right. According to the US Embassy, ARENA pragmatists led by party cofounder Hugo Barrera plan to announce soon the formation of a new conservative party that will attempt to absorb moderate rightists while isolating the hardliners led by D'Aubuisson. Meanwhile, the conservative PCN, as a result of its ill-fated election coalition with ARENA, has ousted [] Secretary General Raul Molina and replaced him with the more progressive Hugo Carillo, who favors cooperation with the Christian Democrats. []

Duarte's handling of his rightist opposition will determine in part his relationship with the private sector and the prospects for economic recovery. In the aftermath of the March election, conservative businessmen are concerned about the government's economic strategy, and probably will continue their wait-and-see approach toward investment in the hope that Duarte will allow for private-sector input into economic decision making. []

[] Planning Minister Chavez Mena is working behind-the-scenes to effect new economic policies that will address the concerns of domestic businessmen and foreign investors. Vice President Castillo Claramount is pressing his boss to dedicate more time to safeguarding private-sector interests. Duarte's recent announcement of relaxed government regulations of the coffee industry was heavily favored by the President's economic advisers. []

On the left, Duarte believes the election represented a popular mandate to search for a peaceful solution to the war, but he also knows that he must do so without allowing the insurgents to manipulate the dialogue process, which would give the right an issue to use against him. He is therefore seeking preliminary private discussions with insurgent representatives to determine a basic agenda for a third round of talks. Press reports indicate that President Duarte is communicating with the guerrillas through church intermediaries to urge "humanization" of the war, a reference to curtailing terrorism and attacks on civilian and economic targets. []

We believe pursuit of dialogue reflects Duarte's hope that non-Marxist political elements can be split from the Marxist majority in the insurgent alliance. Although highly unlikely in the near term, prospects for such a separation have been improved by signs of growing dissension within guerrilla ranks in the wake of the elections. []

[] non-Marxist insurgent spokesman Guillermo Ungo believes the hardline guerrilla leadership has erred in attempting to negate the Salvadoran election and deride its results. []

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ungo
apparently feels that the Christian Democratic victory
at the polls will allow Duarte to deal more flexibly
with the guerrillas in future talks. [REDACTED]

Nevertheless, guerrilla hardliners recognize that
whatever political leverage they have flows from their
capabilities to use violence. To this end, they
reportedly intend to escalate harassment operations in
the cities in the hope of pressuring Duarte back to the
peace table. They currently are engaged in a
campaign of threats and kidnaping against Christian
Democratic mayors, particularly in the east [REDACTED]

Outlook

The landslide victory of the Christian Democrats
suggests both opportunities and pitfalls for El
Salvador's fledgling democracy. President Duarte and
his party can legitimately claim they have received a
popular mandate to end the civil war and revitalize
the economy. Beyond that, the nation remains deeply
divided as to the means to achieve these goals. The
vote for the Christian Democrats does not, in our
view, reflect a groundswell of grassroots support for a
specific reformist agenda. Indeed, the Christian
Democrats have yet to develop a comprehensive
strategy to address the fundamental problems facing
the country. In effect, the ruling party is likely to
continue dealing with national issues on a largely ad
hoc basis, as it determines to what degree it will
accommodate the priorities of the conservative
opposition, the private sector, and the armed forces in
order to stay in power. [REDACTED]

With economic issues becoming increasingly critical,
we judge that Duarte's pragmatic side will dominate
the idealistic, at least in the near term. Social welfare
programs probably will remain underfinanced and
poorly managed, and dialogue with the guerrillas is
unlikely to spawn any major breakthroughs. At the
same time, however, firebrand reformists within
Christian Democratic ranks, labor organizations, and
the church are likely to resist any perceived
backsliding by Duarte from election results they feel
justify more radical socioeconomic and political
change. [REDACTED]

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**Cuba-Algeria:
Deteriorating Relations?**

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The presentation to visiting Algerian President Bendjedid of the Order of Jose Marti—the highest award Cuba gives to a foreigner—signals Havana's intensified courting of one of its traditionally most valued allies. Cuban and Algerian ties date back to 1963 when President Castro sent combat troops to Algeria to demonstrate solidarity in that country's border dispute with Morocco. Throughout the years Havana has closely identified with Algeria's radical positions on numerous Third World issues. At the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit in Algiers in 1973 Algeria played an important role in helping Cuba to gain influence in the organization and paved the way for Castro's chairmanship of the movement from 1979 to 1983.

Since Algerian President Bendjedid came to power in 1979, however, Algeria has resisted Havana's efforts to gain support for Cuban political objectives and to increase economic ties. Throughout Castro's chairmanship of the NAM, the Algerians attempted to check Castro's efforts to define the movement in pro-Soviet terms. More recently, Havana has suffered diplomatic snubs by the Algerians as well.

the Cuban *Prensa Latina* staff in Algiers has been asked to vacate its residence so it can be turned into an Algerian official's residence. Algeria also announced its intention to replace Cuban medical personnel in Algeria with Chinese medics, charging that the Cuban doctors lacked even rudimentary medical skills. Such incidents, coupled with Algiers' recent warming to the United States, have worried Havana.

Cuba's uncharacteristic tolerance of these slights demonstrates the high priority Havana places on retaining ties to Algeria. Termination of relations would cause Havana to lose an important political link to the Arab world and a strong ally in the UN. Algeria's move Westward would also be seen in Havana as a major loss for the Nonaligned Movement, inasmuch as Algiers historically had been one of the most radical members of that organization. For these reasons Cuba has so far swallowed its



Algerian President Bendjedid speaks with President Castro after being awarded Cuba's Order of Jose Marti.

Verde Olivo ©

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political pride and concentrated on reinvigorating relations and gaining support for Cuban political goals during the recent Bendjedid visit to Cuba.

Playing on Algeria's Socialist Credentials

Castro reportedly encouraged Algeria to become more involved in Central American issues, perhaps hoping that appeals to Algiers' anti-imperialist traditions may help redirect what Havana sees as a tilt to the West.

Havana hoped to persuade Bendjedid to include Nicaragua in his trip this September to various Latin American countries to show Algeria's socialist bloc allies that he is resisting US pressure not to go there. Havana reportedly also attempted to interest Bendjedid in an agreement in which Algerian security personnel would gradually replace withdrawn Cuban security

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advisers in Nicaragua. Although we do not yet know whether such a pitch was made, [] Bendjedid rejected the idea of military support to the Nicaraguan Government. []

According to press reports, however, the Cubans did succeed in having Bendjedid meet in Havana with Nicaraguan National Directorate member Bayardo Arce and agree to host a Nicaraguan delegation to discuss combating the US trade embargo. In addition, increased Algerian economic aid to Nicaragua was [] not rejected. []

Cuban officials also probed the visiting delegation on Algeria's commitment to the Polisario Front, which has been carrying on a guerrilla campaign for several years against Morocco for control of the disputed Western Sahara region. []

[] the Cubans, who have provided medical assistance, political support, and paramilitary training to the Polisario since the 1970s, indicated willingness again to send arms and advisers to assist the Polisario. The offer was [] rejected by Bendjedid. []

Stalled Economic Programs

The Cubans probably pressed Bendjedid to move on a variety of stalled bilateral economic agreements to gain much-needed hard currency and expand the Cuban presence in Algeria. []

In this regard, Algerian officials deflected Cuban requests for increased purchases of Cuban agricultural products in the absence of increased purchases of Algerian petroleum products. Havana has been negotiating, without success thus far, to establish a joint shipping line and to cooperate in producing canned vegetables. Cuba also is concerned about a suspended agreement that allowed Cubans to work in Algeria in the animal husbandry field and reportedly would like to revive negotiations on improving Algeria's Biskra Airport and on disputed financing for construction of 800 housing units in Bou Saada. Moreover, it is anxious to increase the number of Cubans working on foreign projects and for foreign companies in Algeria. []

Havana is faced with pressure from the Soviets to get its economic house in order, and it probably is frustrated that more than 20 years of relations with

Algeria have failed to produce significant economic benefits. The reported establishment of a Cuban-Algerian bank indicates nonetheless that Havana still desires to accelerate economic activity between the two nations. []

Outlook

Despite efforts focused on Bendjedid, the lack of media information on the visit suggests that few of Castro's goals were achieved. *Granma's* banner headlines of Bendjedid's imminent arrival and daily activities were followed by neither a joint communique nor any announcement of signed agreements. It appears that, at best, relations will remain in their current state while Havana maneuvers for greater influence. Algeria's appearance as a political ally and potential economic partner means Havana will endure brushoffs while looking for other ways to influence Algeria's policy trend. []

Cuba may resort to techniques it has used successfully with other recalcitrant countries—third party leverage or cultivation of an ally in the Algerian Government to promote Havana's interests. Cuba might also try to bring its reluctant ally back into the socialist camp by using disinformation to discredit the United States in the eyes of the Algerians. Castro probably would find this option particularly appealing because it could check Algeria's Westward moves while publicly reducing US political stature. Regardless of the backdoor approaches taken, Cuba probably will continue to express solidarity with Algeria and intensify diplomatic overtures in the hopes of tangible economic and political rewards. Havana is unlikely to risk a public schism with such an important ally. []

For its part, the Bendjedid government will continue to pay lipservice to Cuban interests while looking for ways to deemphasize the relationship. Algiers probably believes that the appearance of good relations with Havana will placate Moscow's growing concern that Algeria is drifting too close to the West. Algeria, however, has made a commitment to ease its dependence on Soviet military equipment as well as to acquire more Western economic assistance. To this end, Algiers is trying to expand bilateral trade with

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the United States and Latin America, and has probably assessed that a close identification with Cuban policy, especially in Nicaragua, would not serve its interests in this respect

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Trinidad and Tobago: Growing Narcotics Trafficking and Use

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Trinidad and Tobago is becoming an increasingly important transshipment point for narcotics destined for North American and European markets. At the same time, the use of marijuana and cocaine has markedly increased in the country. The government apparently wants to curb the drug problem but is hampered by bureaucratic inefficiency and a shortage of police manpower. We believe that the worsening economy and the proliferation of trafficking networks are major causes of the narcotics activity and that the problem will grow worse unless the government develops the capacity for more effective eradication and interdiction operations.

The Narcotics Threat

Trinidad and Tobago's involvement in the international drug scene has increased sharply in the past few years. US Embassy and DEA officials in the region report that the two-island nation has become particularly important as a transshipment point for cocaine destined for the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. We believe several factors have escalated the country's role as a drug transshipper, supplier, and market:

- US and Colombian interdiction efforts in the Windward Passage between Jamaica and Cuba have prompted traffickers to shift to new transit areas from South America.
- The country's inadequate law enforcement, abundance of secluded harbors, and location between the major suppliers to the south and markets to the north have encouraged traffickers to use Trinidad as a drug transshipment center or refueling stop.
- The favorable climate and availability of secluded growing sites facilitate marijuana production.
- The four-year-old recession in Trinidad's oil-based economy has increased the attractiveness of illegal drug operations to some Trinidadians.

Transit Routes and Traffickers

According to a US State Department study, cocaine entering Trinidad originates mainly in Colombia and transits the country through Venezuelan ports located along the Orinoco River and the Gulf of Paria. Some marijuana reportedly may also be coming from Jamaica. Commercial and private aircraft and ships are the major means of transshipment, according to the US Embassy. The Embassy indicates that the towns of Carupano and Macuro in northern Venezuela are the most likely sources for waterborne narcotics traffic. Trinidadian customs officials have told Embassy officials that freight containers have been equipped with false walls to accommodate narcotics contraband.

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some vessels carrying marijuana and cocaine sail from Colombia to Trinidad. The boats then proceed north into the Atlantic Ocean along the Antillean chain or transfer their cargo to "motherships" for the trip north. The US Embassy in Guyana has indicated that Jamaican marijuana traffickers may be using an indirect route from Jamaica to Trinidad via Guyana because ships and aircraft traveling directly between Jamaica and Trinidad are suspected of drug smuggling.

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Piarco International Airport, Trinidad's only such facility, provides a major intermediate point for drug transshipments, especially cocaine from South America, according to the Embassy. Trinidadian officials have indicated that traffickers posing as businessmen or tourists traveling on commercial airlines are smuggling cocaine and small amounts of marijuana through the airport, near Port of Spain.

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We have no credible evidence that Trinidad's drug dealers or traffickers control large, sophisticated operations. Instead, we believe Trinidadians act as middlemen or local distributors for the South American-controlled narcotics rings. For example,

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the US Embassy in Port of Spain indicated in 1983 that a Venezuelan drug ring may be smuggling cocaine into the United States through Trinidad. []

[] recent US State Department study concluded that increased interdiction efforts along traditional routes over the past year have prompted Colombian traffickers to find new routes. Consequently, we believe that Trinidad is increasingly being viewed by some traffickers as a safer alternative to traditional routes. []

Domestic Production

An Embassy source reports that marijuana—the only narcotic substance produced in Trinidad and Tobago—traditionally has been cultivated in central Trinidad between the towns of Biche and Rio Claro. This remote region, thinly populated and sheltered by dense forests and steep hills, makes detection difficult. Recent eradication efforts have encouraged a shift in some production to Trinidad's north coast, where dense forests and rugged terrain facilitate cultivation. The same source reports that individual growers rather than organized trafficking rings are responsible for most cultivation. []

Despite police crackdowns, production remains high. Police claim to have seized 1.1 metric tons of cured marijuana and to have destroyed 7.4 million marijuana plants early in 1984, but the Embassy reports that bumper harvests this year have lowered street prices. According to Embassy reporting, a Trinidadian police source has described marijuana plots as typically less than one-quarter acre in size. Police narcotics officers have told Embassy officials that marijuana cultivation on Trinidad alone encompasses a maximum of 800 acres producing two crops a year. []

Drug Abuse

The domestic drug problem seems to be a relatively recent phenomenon. Virtually all marijuana produced locally is consumed there, according to US officials in the country. According to Embassy reporting, sales are clustered around Port of Spain, San Fernando, Arima, and Rio Claro, but marijuana can be

purchased easily throughout the country. Although the use of drugs has grown rapidly since the early 1980s, according to Embassy and US Defense Department reports, no official statistics are available on addiction rates. []

however, that 30 to 40 percent of Trinidadian youth currently use marijuana and that, more alarmingly, 10 to 20 percent use cocaine. The US Embassy composite of police and health official data indicates that the country consumed 100,000 pounds of marijuana and 300 pounds of cocaine in 1984, but we believe these estimates are low. Marijuana and cocaine appear to be the only narcotics substances abused on a large scale, although []

[] heroin and angel dust (PCP) have entered the country in small quantities. []

Government Response

Sensitive to its international image, the government of Prime Minister George Chambers over the past year has become increasingly concerned about the rise in drug activity. According to the US Embassy, this attention stems in part from extensive publicity about drug trafficking activities elsewhere in the region—particularly in The Bahamas, where involvement by officials in narcotics trafficking has led to widespread public criticism of the Pindling government. The Trinidadian Government reportedly is keenly aware that the small Caribbean islands are ideally suited as transit points for illegal trade and that many officials can be easily tempted to augment their incomes by some degree of participation. []

Despite the government's concern, numerous obstacles have slowed progress in curbing the drug problem. The United States since 1976 has been the only foreign country providing narcotics control training to Trinidadian officials. According to the US Embassy, Trinidadian participation in US training programs has been poor because of the inefficiency that has long typified the local bureaucracy.

Administrative delays and lack of coordination among the various ministries have hindered other government efforts to deal with the problem. Of the four agencies contributing to narcotics control in Trinidad and Tobago, the police, immigration, and coast guard are responsible to the Minister of National Security;

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customs answers to the Ministry of Finance and Planning. Coordination between customs and the other agencies reportedly is poor because of jealousy and mistrust between the two ministries. Lax customs and immigration procedures at airports and seaports have further hindered progress. Moreover, no official treatment programs for addicts currently exist in the country. []

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A special police narcotics squad is responsible for directing arrests for narcotics possession and trafficking. When the squad was formed in 1977, its primary activities consisted of periodic forays into the countryside to destroy marijuana plants and occasional visits to public schools to conduct drug education. In response to the rise in drug activity, the 12-man squad was upgraded in late 1983 and put under the direction of an assistant superintendent and an inspector. Raids on traffickers and growers last year resulted in large seizures of marijuana and cocaine that have helped to focus the attention of the government and populace on the narcotics problem. []

Nevertheless, the head of the narcotics squad has complained to Embassy personnel of the ease with which even those relatively few traffickers arrested can obtain bail regardless of the charges against them or their prior arrest records. He notes the difficulty in obtaining strong criminal convictions against them because Trinidad's bail regulations do not restrict travel of those charged in drug-related activities. As a result, local authorities are unable to halt flight to avoid prosecution. []

According to the US Embassy, the courts are lenient in their treatment of possession of illegal drugs, particularly marijuana. Offenders are aided by the heavy backlog of court cases and are generally fined less than \$200. Moreover, several policemen have complained to Embassy officials that influence peddling among judges and politicians makes conviction of large-scale dealers nearly impossible. According to the Embassy, however, no high-ranking elected officials have been implicated in drug-related activities. []

The circumstances surrounding the removal of Police Commissioner Randolph Burroughs from his post earlier this year lend credence to growing charges of

corruption in the police force. []

[] a government investigation implicated Burroughs in narcotics and currency trafficking. []

US officials report that the identities of several drug traffickers in Trinidad are well known, and their ability to operate without police interference has prompted widespread suspicion of police protection, particularly from Burroughs. Larger scale marijuana growers and drug traffickers reportedly have paid as much as 10 percent of their profits for police protection, while well-publicized raids were conducted against those refusing to pay. The chief of the narcotics squad has told US Embassy officials that he believes the allegations against Burroughs are true. []

Outlook

We foresee little prospect that Trinidad and Tobago's involvement in drug activities will be substantially curtailed in the next few years. Major factors in our analysis are the expected further downturn in the Trinidadian economy and the demonstration effect of existing trafficking networks that encourages Trinidad to be used as an alternate path when interdiction efforts intensify along more traditional routes. According to press reports, Crown Point Airport on Tobago is being upgraded from a small airstrip to an international facility to promote tourism. We believe the refurbished airport—completion is scheduled in March 1986—is likely to become an attractive alternative point for narcotics traffickers. Moreover, the government's insufficient manpower and material resources are likely to continue to handicap eradication efforts. This is reflected by the failure so far this year to implement a vigorous marijuana eradication program. According to the Embassy, only isolated raids are likely to occur. []

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**Peru:
Incipient Foreign Support
for Sendero Luminoso** [redacted]

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Since 1980 Sendero Luminoso (SL) has been waging an insurgency in Peru without the benefit of assistance from abroad in the form of arms, training, or funding. Despite occasional allegations by Peruvian officials and the foreign media that SL receives support from the Soviet Bloc or Cuba, there is no corroborative evidence. Indeed, Peruvian security officials—including the Minister of War—have told US officials privately that they have no evidence of any SL international connections. [redacted]

[redacted] We have evidence, however, mainly from open sources, that a little over a year ago, SL established its first formal international ties by joining a fledgling Maoist organization, the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM). RIM's member parties are small, and it does not appear sufficiently well funded at this point to be able to offer significant financial assistance, but the relationship will bear watching in the months ahead. [redacted]

Evolution of Sendero's Ties to RIM

RIM was the outgrowth of an international conference of 13 Maoist parties convened in the fall of 1980—probably in Paris—under the auspices of the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA, and the now defunct Revolutionary Communist Party of Chile. Reflecting the participants' Maoist orientation, the conference communique attacked not only "imperialist" Western governments but also the "revisionist" Soviets, Vietnamese, and Cubans, as well as the Albanians and Chinese. Soon after the conference one of the two British groups that attended began publishing an international journal, *A World to Win*. In May 1982 the journal published a message from the "Political Bureau, Regional Committee Tupac Amaru of the Communist Party of Peru"¹

¹ SL's full name is The Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui's Thought. It is separate from the pro-Moscow Peruvian Communist Party that has condemned SL's use of violence. There is no evidence of a connection between the Tupac Amaru Regional Committee of SL and the newly formed Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, which has received expressions of approval from the pro-Moscow party. [redacted]

praising the conference communique and declaring its intent to "join forces" with the "international proletariat." By March 1984 SL formally affiliated with RIM at its second international meeting held in London, at which time the membership had grown to at least 18 (see table). [redacted]

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By late last year, according to unclassified documents, RIM members had helped form pro-SL support groups in the United States, and France, and had begun distributing propaganda published by SL and RIM. The New York Police Department believes that an SL support group almost certainly staged a demonstration and attempted a break-in last month at the Peruvian Consulate in New York, according to the US Mission at the United Nations. This was the first such action on behalf of SL outside Peru. Soon thereafter, the Peruvian Foreign Ministry expressed concern to US officials about a death threat by phone to the Peruvian Consulate in Los Angeles, issued apparently by the SL's North American ally in the RIM, the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA. For its part, SL has publicized the existence and objectives of RIM in Peru. [redacted]

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RIM's Value to SL

Several factors indicate that RIM's ability to assist SL is limited. There is no evidence that either RIM or its members receive support from any foreign government, and its strident verbal assaults on governments of virtually every political orientation hardly invite such assistance. The evident smallness of most RIM affiliates, the fact that leaders of several are exiled from their native countries, and their narrow ideological focus suggest they are unable to mobilize significant material resources. [redacted]

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Nevertheless, SL loses nothing by consorting with these foreign friends and can benefit from whatever support they provide. SL has acknowledged publicly RIM's positive impact on the morale of its cadre, and the incidents in New York and Los Angeles

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Groups Associated With Revolutionary Internationalist Movement

Country	Party	Leaders	Signed 1980 Joint Communique	Signed 1984 RIM Declaration	Comments
Bangladesh	Proletarian Party of Purba Bangla			•	No other information available.
Ceylon	Ceylon Communist Party	N. Sanmugathasan, General Secretary	•	•	General Secretary participated in March 1984 press conference in London where formation of RIM was discussed. Said he had visited USSR three times. Publishes <i>Kamkarua</i> (Worker).
China	Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)				A "clandestine document from the Central Committee" was published in the May 1981 issue of <i>A World to Win</i> . The document defended Mao's widow and attacked the present Chinese regime.
Chile	Revolutionary Communist Party of Chile	Apparently living in Paris	•		Participated in drafting 1980 Joint Communique, and contributed strongly worded anti-Soviet article "Some Particularities of Contemporary Pro-Soviet Revisionism" to the May 1981 issue of <i>A World to Win</i> . Not heard from since then.
Colombia	Communist Party of Colombia (Marxist-Leninist), Mao Tsetung Regional Committee			•	Designation Mao Tsetung Regional Committee indicates this party has split off from the Communist Party of Colombia (Marxist-Leninist), which is the political arm of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) insurgent group. EPL and its political arm are still friendly toward China and Albania.
	Revolutionary Communist Group of Colombia			•	Publishes <i>Alborada Comunista</i> (Communist Dawn), datelined Bogota. Criticized EPL for being "pro-Hoxha," that is, friendly toward Albanian regime. Criticized those Colombian insurgent groups that agreed to truce with government.
Denmark	Mao Tsetung Kredsen		•		No other information available.
Dominican Republic	Revolutionary Communist Union	Wilberto Ventura	•	•	Formed in September 1980 as a split from the Democratic Popular Movement. US Embassy Santo Domingo estimated its membership in 1982 as no more than 25 to 50. Publishes newspaper <i>La Chispa Revolucionaria</i> (Revolutionary Spark).

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Groups Associated With Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (continued)

Country	Party	Leaders	Signed 1980 Joint Communique	Signed 1984 RIM Declaration	Comments
France	For the Proletarian International		•		Contributed articles to the May 1981 and May 1982 issues of <i>A World to Win</i> . The second, strongly critical of Soviet policy toward Poland, was accompanied by a statement indicating the group had dissolved.
Haiti	Haitian International Revolutionary Group			•	Published a French-language brochure in mid-1984 criticizing the orthodox, pro-Moscow Haitian Communist Party for inactivity and stressing its affiliation with the RIM.
India	Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), Central	K. Chittaranjam (also spelled Chittanjam)	•	•	Committee formed in 1979. Its newspaper is <i>Mass Line</i> . Chittaranjam denied entry to the United Kingdom for March 1984 meeting where RIM was formed.
	Revolutionary Community Party, India	Narbhinder Singh Jagjit Cheema		•	March-April 1984 issue of its journal, <i>The Communist View Point</i> , reprinted several RIM documents.
Iran	Union of Iranian Communists (Sarbedaran)	Ferhad Safinya		•	Statement submitted to RIM harshly criticized "religious despotism" of Khomeini regime, including regime policies toward Kurdish minority.
Italy	Proletarian Communist Organization (Marxist-Leninist)		•	•	No other information available.
	Communist Collective of Agit/Prop			•	No other information available.
	Communist Committee of Trento				No. 1, 1985 issue of <i>A World to Win</i> identifies this committee as a member of RIM but it is not listed in the 1984 RIM Declaration.
Nepal	Nepal Communist Party (Mashal)			•	Party was scheduled to join the two Indian member groups for a joint demonstration in Delhi in May 1984.
New Zealand	New Zealand Red Flag Group		•	•	Statement published in May 1982 issue of <i>A World to Win</i> repeatedly uses first person singular—suggesting group is minuscule.

Groups Associated With Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (continued)

Country	Party	Leaders	Signed 1980 Joint Communique	Signed 1984 RIM Declaration	Comments
Peru	Communist Party of Peru (Sendero Luminoso)	Abimael Guzman (Comrade Gonzalo)		•	Launched insurgency in May 1980. Political Bureau of Sendero Luminoso's Tupac Amaru Regional Committee sent February 1981 letter, published in May 1982 issue of <i>A World to Win</i> , indicating solidarity with international movement. French media reported in November 1984 that SL representatives had organized a support group in France in early 1983. Support groups appear to be functioning in at least two US cities, Berkeley, California, and New York City. RCP, USA distributes SL propaganda in at least 12 US locations.
Senegal	Marxist-Leninist Group of Senegal		•		No further information.
Spain	Marxist-Leninist Union of Struggle		•		Formed in 1977. Used the name Group for Defense of Marxism-Leninism when it signed the 1980 Joint Communique. Its statement published in May 1981 issue of <i>A World to Win</i> endorsed national self-determination for Basques, Catalans, Galicians, and Canary Islanders.
Turkey	Communist Party of Turkey (Marxist-Leninist)	Delal Kamaci		•	Represented party at March 1984 meeting where RIM was formed. Biographic profile indicates she was then 29, of Kurdish extraction, and was "carrying out her revolutionary work in West Germany"—suggesting that the party's leadership is also in exile.
United Kingdom	Nottingham Communist Group		•	•	Published May 1981 and May 1982 issues of <i>A World to Win</i> .
	Stockport Communist Group		•	•	Used name Marxist-Leninist Collective in signing 1980 Joint Communique.
	(?) Revolutionary Communist Group				Uses same London mailing address as RIM Information Bureau and No. 1, 1985 issue of <i>A World to Win</i> . However, its manifesto is pro-Soviet, not Maoist.
United States	Revolutionary Communist Party, USA	Bob Avakian Carl Dix	•	•	Probably the main driving force behind formation of RIM. Expresses unconditional support for SL. Avakian living in France since 1980. Dix represented party at March 1984 London meeting where RIM was formed.

Note: RIM is attempting to recruit other members, such as the Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed wing, the New People's Army.

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demonstrate that pro-SL groups may indirectly further the insurgents' cause by harassing Peruvian diplomatic missions and other officials in the United States and elsewhere. [REDACTED]

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Outlook

Over the longer term, RIM's potential for aiding insurgencies in Peru or elsewhere depends on its success in persuading groups already engaged in such conflicts—groups with numerous supporters and significant resources—that they stand to gain by joining the movement and supporting its international objectives. No present RIM member except SL fits that category, but the movement is publicly attempting to recruit some who do, including the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People's Army, with a combined membership of about 60,000. The evident ideological affinity between RIM members and the CPP—for example, the CPP and SL each use the same three Maoist texts for cadre training and their party flags are identical—raises the possibility that the Philippine group might formally join RIM or at least develop bilateral relations with its most important member, SL. [REDACTED]

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Latin America Brief

Brazil	Defense Cuts [REDACTED]	25X1
	<p>To reduce defense expenditures, the new civilian administration is canceling a number of major equipment purchases and delaying others planned by the previous military government. [REDACTED] because of budget cuts, the Navy Minister, Admiral Saboia, has canceled a contract to purchase 20 refitted M41 tanks for the Marines from a Brazilian firm. He has canceled the acquisition of two river patrol boats from another Brazilian company, and postponed the purchase of a third. Saboia also plans to call off the purchase of one of five West German submarines, thereby saving \$50 million. [REDACTED]</p>	25X1
	<p>The new government is reducing the operating budgets of the military services, which has led to grumbling among some officers. [REDACTED] is being cut by 25 percent, and the Air Force's by 20 to 30 percent. Some research and development projects funded by the military are being slashed or eliminated, [REDACTED] High priority programs, however, such as nuclear and missile projects and the Sonda IV rocket program, [REDACTED] are not being cut. [REDACTED]</p>	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
	<p>In our judgment, the cuts that have occurred are unlikely to cause a sharp deterioration in military-civilian relations or a major decline in Brazil's defense capabilities. The need for spending cuts in a period of economic austerity is generally recognized by the military. Moreover, the government's plans for going ahead with selected development programs and acquisitions—for example, of submarines and missiles—indicate that military modernization is not being abandoned. [REDACTED]</p>	25X1

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